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BIANNUAL SURVEY
Rolls Royce of Canada, Ltd., which, in turn, owned all the stock
of Rolls Royce, Inc., a Delaware corporation doing business in
New York. The Delaware subsidiary owned no products of
its own, and its sole business consisted of selling and servicing
the products of the parent. The subsidiary bought from the
parent at a price lower than that which the ultimate consumer
paid. The parent, however, gave the warranty and paid the
subsidiary a fixed annual fee for services rendered in connection
with these warranties. The court, rejecting the contention that
the subsidiary was an independent purchaser, held that it was,
in effect, a sales agent of the parent, thereby subjecting the parent
to in personam jurisdiction. 63
Section 302 (a) (2) - Commission of a "Tortious Act"; circulation
of a dangerous instrumentality.
Two very significant recent decisions in this area are Singer
v. Walker64 and Feathers v. McLucas.6 5  In both cases, the
courts sustained jurisdiction upon the theory that a tortious act
was committed within New York.
There has been an increased sensitivity of recent for both
acquisition-of-jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes, as to whether
a tortious act is committed at the place of manufacture or at the
place of injury.66 But it is worthy of note, indeed, when even
for only jurisdictional purposes a tortious act is held to have
occurred at the place where a product (which later, and elsewhere,
produced the injury) was merely circulated for, or even after,
sale.
The Singer case holds just that. There the defendant, an
Illinois corporation, manufactured geologists' hammers, labeled them
unbreakable, and shipped them f.o.b. Rockford, Illinois, to a New
York dealer. The New York dealer bought them via mail order
by use of a catalogue sent to him by defendant. In February 1960,
the infant-plaintiff's aunt bought one such hammer in New York
and thereafter presented it to him as a gift. In April 1960, while
on a field trip in Connecticut, the hammer broke while being used
by the plaintiff to break rocks. This resulted in plaintiff's loss
63 Id. at 75, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
6421 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
6521 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964).
6sSee Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.
1959); Hellriegel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill.
1957); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc.
2d 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Fornabaio v. Swissair Transp. Co.,
42 Misc. 2d 182, 247 N.Y.S2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964). As to the choice-of-
law problem, see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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of an eye. An action was brought for negligence and breach of
warranty in New York. Special term dismissed the action on
the ground that the cause of action did not arise from any tortious
act or transaction of business in this state, i.e., that neither (1)
nor (2) of 302(a) applied. The appellate division reversed, holding
that because "defendant was responsible for a continuous tortious
act, namely, the circulation in New York of a defective hammer,
always bearing its mislabeling, a tortious act occurred in this state
from which the cause of action arose. . . ., 7 The fact that
the injury occurred in Connecticut was deemed irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes. The result is that a single injury may be
the product of many tortious acts for jurisdictional (as opposed
to choice-of-law) purposes. Assuming each jurisdiction has a
"tortious act" jurisdictional statute like CPLR 302 (a) (2), the act
would be held to have been committed in (1) the place of manu-
facture, (2) the place of circulation and (3) the place of injury.
Clearly (1) and (3) are jurisdictional predicates. The Singer
case adds (2).
In Feathers, the court reached the same result, but that case
fell under (3) of the foregoing list, a more usual jurisdictional
foundation. In Feathers, the defendant corporation was a Kansas
manufacturer of pressure tanks. Defendant sold one of these
tanks to a Missouri corporation which affixed the tank to a trailer
chassis and wheels. The trailer, as completed, was sold to a
Pennsylvania corporation engaged in interstate commerce. En-
route from Pennsylvania to Vermont, the tank exploded in New
York causing injury to plaintiff. The supreme court had held
that there was no jurisdiction over defendant on the ground that
only the injury and not the tortious act occurred in New York.68
In reversing, the appellate division held that "the Legislature
did not intend to separate foreign wrongful acts from resulting
forum consequences and that the acts complained of here can be
said to have been committed in this State." 69
In both Singer and Feathers, the courts placed great emphasis
on the fact that there was an instrumentality involved which,
if negligently manufactured, would be dangerous to life, and that
it would be reasonable, therefore, to hold defendant responsible
in New York for the consequences of his act.
While Feathers may itself be somewhat of an extension of
Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp.,70 since defend-
ant's contacts with the forum state were more remote in
67 Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218
(1st Dep't 1964).6SFeathers v. McLucas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct.
1963). This case was reported in 38 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 412 (1964).
69 Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550
(3d Dep't 1964). (The case is currently before the court of appeals.)7 0 Supra note 66.
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Feathers than in Gray, the Singer case goes even further than
Feathers. Although both cases involved a defective instrumentality
which found its way into New York, the Singer case involved
no injury in New York. What was important in Singer was that
plaintiff came into possession of the hammer while it was still
in circulation in New York. This, for the court, was an
"essential nexus to sustain jurisdiction." 71 The tortious act was
held to have continued so long as the defective hammer circulated
in New York. Once the user came into possession of the product
in New York, it was immaterial where he took it. However, the
court further indicated that if plaintiff had been given the hammer
in Connecticut rather than in New York, the cause of action
would have had no relation to the tortious act committed in
New York, namely, the circulation of the defective hammer. The
court made note of the fact that defendant had made various
transactions of business in New York, for example, sending sales-
men and catalogues into the state, but this was not the deciding
factor in the case. The court indicated' that due process con-
siderations would be more restrictive if the case involved a
"transaction of business" question (CPLR 302(a) (1)), but that
when a dangerous instrumentality is involved (producing a tortious
act under CPLR 302(a)(2)) the responsibility should be greater.
In the Feathers case, defendant's sole contact with the state
was the entry into the borders of New York of its cargo pressure
tank. Defendant apparently had never engaged in any business
activity in New York. Nevertheless, the court sustained jur-
isdiction, stating that "jurisdiction of a State may be extended
over a foreign corporation where 'single or occasional acts . . .
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit' on causes of action arising therefrom." 72
Tests for jurisdiction.
When a non-domiciliary knows or ought to know that his
product will find its way into New York, he should be compelled
to answer here for any damage caused by his negligent act
in the manufacture of that product. 73  However, the nature of
the product is an important factor. It is questionable whether the
courts would, or could entertain jurisdiction if the product happens
to be defective yarn,7 4 which is not inherently dangerous, as
7' Singer v. Walker, supra note 67, at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
72 Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 69, at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551;
see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).73 Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., supra note 66; Fornabaio v. Swiss-
air Transp. Co., supra note 66.
74 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956).
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